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Abstract
The present paper looks at the implications of anticipated changes in population
size and composition for the projected number of deaths from natural disasters
Building on empirical evidence from cross-country time series of factors associated
with natural disaster fatalities since 1970 in 174 countries, the paper first highlights
the major role of education in enabling people to cope with weather extremes in the
past. Using the five demographic scenarios implied by the Shared Socioeconomic
Pathways (SSPs), which include trajectories for the future of educational expansion,
this evidence is translated in the second part of the paper into projections of the
number of deaths from climate-related extreme natural events for six major world
regions. Assuming constant hazard, we demonstrate the importance of including in
assessments of future vulnerability not only the projected population size but the
full population heterogeneity by age, sex and level of education.
1 Introduction
Following a widespread definition, environmental risk can be described as a function
of hazard and vulnerability (Brooks et al. 2005). Hazard is usually a necessary
precondition for natural disasters, but it typically also requires a vulnerable
population who are exposed to the hazard. While hazard is largely geographically
determined, or is a matter of ‘where’ you are; vulnerability is strongly linked to
social factors, or is a matter of ‘who’ you are. In searching for ways of reducing
future risks associated with natural catastrophes, we thus need to look more closely
at the determinants of vulnerability. Given that changing climatic conditions are
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expected to lead to both more frequent and more catastrophic extreme weather
events, levels of future vulnerability to natural disasters will be closely related to
societies’ adaptive capacities.
As an important source of premature mortality, vulnerability to natural disasters
is of significant demographic interest, even in the absence of climate change. One
important characteristic of vulnerability that has been studied extensively is age.
Vulnerability to natural disasters affects people at all stages of their life course.
While there is some evidence that people at the very beginning and at the very end
of their life cycle are more vulnerable because they directly depend on the help of
others, other factors tend to dominate differences in the risks faced by non-elderly
adults (KC, Lutz, et al. 2014). These factors range from household characteristics
associated with economic standing (such as the construction and stability of the
house) to the ecological setting of the house, to individual behavioural variables.
Less attention has been paid in risk studies to the important role of another
individual characteristic: namely, the level of educational attainment. This gap in
the research has recently been filled in part by a series of studies published as a
special issue of Ecology & Society, which clearly demonstrated the decisive role of
education in risk reduction (Butz et al. 2014). But in general, the future adaptive
capacities of societies and the differential vulnerabilities of their members continue
to be among the least studied aspects of the important question of how dangerous
climate change is likely to be for future human well-being.
To study more thoroughly the interactions of socioeconomic developments and
societies’ levels of resilience to climate change, and also to provide a scenario
‘thread’ through the different climate research communities (van Vuuren et al. 2012),
the global integrated-assessment modelling community has recently joined forces
with the impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability community to launch a new scenario
development effort (Kriegler et al. 2012), which has resulted in the creation of a
set of scenarios known as the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). The SSPs
are representative narratives of how the world might develop over the course of the
21st century that follow a widely negotiated and sufficiently broad range of possible
alternative trajectories, particularly with regard to future societies’ capacities for
mitigation and adaptation to climate change (O’Neill et al. 2013). Using these
narratives, researchers can integrate their findings and make them comparable across
a range of different fields, thereby broadening the scope of our knowledge about the
likely implications of climate change.
The original narratives underlying the SSPs have been translated into the
language of demographic change by KC and Lutz (2014). By uncovering the
‘human core of the SSPs’, the authors have provided comprehensive assumptions
regarding the future of fertility, mortality, migration, and education for all countries
in the world. They emphasised that after age and sex, education is the third most
important source of observable population heterogeneity, and thus demanded the
default inclusion of education in population projections. In light of its strong
influence on the determinants of population development, education is one of the key
variables in the SSPs. As good quality data on years of schooling are hard to come
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by, education in the SSPs is measured by attainment; i.e. by the specified educational
level. The six categories of educational attainment are no education, incomplete
primary, completed primary, lower secondary, upper secondary, and post-secondary
education. The methodological difficulties that had to be overcome in order to
produce the most comprehensive dataset on global educational attainment to date
are described in full detail in KC, Potancˇokova´ et al. (2014).
As has been pointed out by Hunter and O’Neill (2014), the SSPs can be used
to project the effects of demographic trends into the future. Some examples of
such translation attempts include the use of the SSPs for projecting future GDP per
capita (Crespo Cuaresma 2015), assessing the urbanisation impacts from different
scenarios (Jiang and O’Neill 2015), estimating the damage and adaptation costs
resulting from future sea level rise (Hinkel et al. 2014), and estimating the likelihood
of future armed conflict (Hegre et al. 2016).
In this paper, we attempt to provide a similar and innovative translation of the
SSPs to address the issue of future vulnerability to extreme natural events for six
world regions. We explicitly incorporate information from the SSPs about changes
in countries’ population sizes and educational structures. With strong support from
the results presented in Ecology & Society (Muttarak and Lutz 2014), our central
hypothesis is that education can play an important role in reducing the negative
impacts of climate change on future disaster-related mortality. Building on updated
empirical evidence from cross-country time series of factors associated with past
natural disaster fatalities since 1970 in 174 countries (Striessnig et al. 2013), we first
quantify the central role of education in reducing fatalities due to natural disasters.
We also introduce the concept and the narratives of the SSPs, and show what the
different development paths would mean for future total population sizes for each
world region. In the second part, we translate the model results into projections of
numbers of deaths due to climate-related extreme natural events, while making use
of the five demographic scenarios as defined by the SSPs. The results are presented
in the form of the predicted number of deaths for each major world region,1 and
illustrate the effect education is expected to have on future fatalities through changes
in the total size and the educational composition of each population.
2 Data and model specification
Our main source of data for studying the differential impact of natural catastrophes
in different parts of the world is the Emergency Events Data Base (EM-DAT 2010)
maintained by the Centre for the Research of the Epidemiology of Disasters. The
EM-DAT provides information on different disaster outcome measures such as total
financial damage and number of deaths, as well as an approximate estimate of the
number of people affected by a wide range of different types of natural disasters
1 For a complete list of all countries by region, see Table A.1 in the appendix.
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since 1900. Of these three measures, we decided to use the number of deaths
per million of population as our dependent variable, as it is more reliable and
measurable than the other two.
It is important to note that deaths may be undercounted in the EM-DAT. In
a recent comparison with WHO death registration data, Zagheni et al. (in this
issue) showed that the EM-DAT figures appear to underrepresent deaths from small
disasters that did not qualify as natural catastrophes under the EM-DAT criterion of
having caused at least 10 casualties.2 Yet in assessing the impact of natural disasters
it is still preferable to use the number of deaths rather than financial damage figures.
Because financial damage estimates are mainly driven by a country’s wealth, they
tend to overstate damage in rich nations, while making it difficult to determine the
number of people affected. Moreover, because they are often made in the turbulent
aftermath of natural disasters, estimates of financial damage tend to be vague and
unreliable.
It is also important to point out that before the advent of modern communication
technologies and mass media, the likelihood that disasters would be detected varied
across the globe. We therefore restrict ourselves to the period 1970–2010, and
aggregate our data by 10-year intervals to limit the influence of extreme outlier years
and events. Since we are primarily interested in those events that can be expected to
increase as a function of climate change, we further limit our analysis to six different
types of hydro-meteorological disasters.3
On the explanatory side of the equation, we account for the disaster hazard by
controlling for the number of disasters a country experienced within a given decade,
again using data from the EM-DAT. Exposure is controlled for first by assessing
the number of deaths on a per million population basis. In addition, we include the
land mass of a country that is actually inhabited. The proxy used here is arable land
as reported by the World Bank’s development indicators (2012). Since our main
hypothesis is that people are affected differently depending on a country’s average
level of educational attainment, we also control for the share of women aged 20–
39 with at least secondary education. Previous research that considered not just the
total population, but the distribution of the population by age, sex, and level of
educational attainment, has shown that this variable is highly relevant in studying
topics as diverse as economic growth or the transition to a free democracy (Lutz et al.
2008; Lutz et al. 2010). According to these earlier findings, the share of women
aged 20–39 with at least secondary education is the indicator that best reflects
2 The three remaining criteria used by the EM-DAT include (1) 100 or more people affected, (2) a
declaration of a state of emergency, and (3) a call for international rescue help. If any one of these four
criteria is met, an event is counted as a disaster in the EM-DAT database. As not all disasters meet
these criteria, we can assume that the number of disasters is underestimated.
3 These are droughts, floods, storms, extreme temperature events, wildfires, and landslides. Note
that our results are not sensitive to the exclusion of deaths from geophysical events and other less
catastrophic types of disasters.
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Figure 1:
Frequency distribution of number of deaths due to natural disasters, 1970 to 2010
Source: EM-DAT.
inequality, and that has the greatest discriminatory power. Because women aged 20–
39 play central roles in family matters ranging from childbearing to family health
to changes in the labour force participation of household members, they seem to be
of particular importance for social as well as economic development. The data are
obtained from the latest reconstruction of population by age, sex, and educational
attainment by the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital
in Vienna (Lutz et al. 2014). Additional controls include population growth rates and
infant mortality rates from the United Nation’s World Population Prospects (2013),
as well as time-fixed effects and 26 world regions comprised of countries from the
same geographical region with the same most frequent disaster type among the six
disaster types included.
2.1 Estimation method
Figure 1 presents the distribution of the number of deaths due to natural disasters
observed in the EM-DAT over the period 1970–2010, which is our outcome of
interest. As can be seen in Figure 1, there are many country-year combinations in our
sample that report zero casualties from natural catastrophes.4 At the same time, the
variable we are trying to explain appears to be severely over-dispersed. In 83 out of
4 In these cases, an event was counted as a disaster in the EM-DAT database because one of the other
three criteria—other than the criterion of having caused at least 10 deaths—is applied.
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554 observations, the proportion of zeroes is rather high compared to the distribution
of the positive count outcomes; and while the majority of all disasters caused fewer
than 1000 casualties, seven disasters in the observational period were responsible
for more than 40,000 deaths each. To avoid distortions in our predictions due to the
extreme magnitudes of these outliers, we exclude them from our analysis.5
This distribution of the number of deaths due to natural disasters suggests that
the application of a zero-inflated negative binominal or a hurdle model would be
appropriate, as both models can deal with the presence of excess zeroes and over-
dispersion (Atkins et al. 2013). The difference between the two models lies in the
assumptions made about the origin of zeroes. In the hurdle model all zeroes are
assumed to originate from the same process (sampling zeroes), whereas the zero-
inflated models are built on the assumption that there are two kinds of zeroes:
sampling zeroes and structural zeroes (Frome et al. 2012). Since there is no reason
to assume that there are structural zeroes in our dependent variable—i.e. there is no
reason to believe that in any country a natural disaster would not be able to cause
any death per se—we apply a hurdle model. We estimate the model using the pscl-
package in R (Zeileis et al. 2007). Hurdle models are two-part models in which a
model that explicitly models zero- vs. non-zero outcomes is combined with a model
that only handles non-zero outcomes (Atkins et al. 2013). In our analysis, outcomes
of non-zero disaster deaths are modelled as a negative binomial regression with a log
link function (count model), whereas observations with zero deaths are dealt with
in a binomial regression with a logit link function (zero model). This combination
can be described more formally as
fhurdle(y; x, z, β, γ) =

fzero(0; z, γ) if y = 0
(1 − fzero(0; z, γ)) ∗ fcount(y; x, β)1 − fcount(0; x, β) if y > 0
where the model parameters β and γ are estimated by maximum-likelihood (Zeileis
et al. 2007).
2.2 Results from hurdle negative binomial regression models
Earlier results by Striessnig et al. (2013) suggested that education, especially for
women, plays a significant role in reducing disaster fatalities after controlling
for other key determinants of socioeconomic development and exposure to risk.
These results are confirmed when using a larger number of countries and the
refined estimation strategy just described (Table 1). Our approach generates separate
estimation results for observations in which a natural disaster led to at least one
death (count model, prob (Y > 0)) or to no deaths (zero model, prob (Y = 0)).
5 The excluded disasters were in Bangladesh (1970), Ethiopia (1978 and 1984), Mozambique and
Sudan (1985), Bangladesh (1991), and Myanmar (2008).
Erich Striessnig and Elke Loichinger 227
Table 1:
Determinants of national deaths from natural disasters per million of population.
Hurdle regression for 174 countries over 10-year intervals between 1970 and 2010
Variables Prob(Y > 0) Prob(Y = 0)
Constant −3.073∗∗∗ 11.735
(0.72) (8115.58)
Log (#Disasters) 0.796∗∗∗ 4.027∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.52)




Logit (Share Fem 20–39 Sec + Edu) −0.451∗∗∗ −0.889∗∗
(0.16) (0.37)




Dummies for 26 World Regions YES YES





Note: Theta is the dispersion parameter. For a comparison of the model fit with two alternative model specifications
using GDP per capita instead of education, see Table A.1 of the appendix. Significance codes: 0.01 = ∗∗∗; 0.05 = ∗∗;
0.1 = ∗.
We first ran the model using all of the explanatory variables in both models, and
then ran it again while excluding the variables that were insignificant in the first
run. As shown in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix, including the insignificant
variables has only minor effects on our results.
In the part of the model that explains the occurrence of ‘zero’ casualties, apart
from the obviously important logged number of disasters, only the education
variable turns out to have a significant effect pointing in the expected direction:
whereas a greater number of disasters increases the likelihood that a country will
experience one or more deaths, having a higher share of the population with
secondary education decreases the probability that an event will clear the hurdle
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and have a positive casualty count. In the count part of the model we found that
in addition to the variables already included in the zero model, a country’s arable
land mass, population growth rate, and lagged infant mortality rate are significant
predictors of disaster impact. In line with the definition of risk given above, our
results show that countries with vast, thinly populated areas used primarily for
agricultural purposes experience lower deaths per million of population. Conversely,
population pressure, as measured by the population growth rate, tends to put
pressure on infrastructures that may not be capable of dealing with intensified
environmental conditions. In addition, as rapid population growth often does not
allow for adequate planning of settlement projects, countries with fast-growing
populations may have large numbers of highly vulnerable informal settlements.
Not surprisingly, the infant mortality rate, which can be seen as a proxy for the
capacities of a country’s health care system, can reveal weaknesses in national
coping strategies. As has been shown by Pamuk et al. (2011), there is a strong case
that investments in education can help countries reduce their infant mortality rates.
2.3 The SSP scenario framework
The SSPs were designed to include both a qualitative narrative and a quantitative
component that numerically describes the development of certain socioeconomic
drivers of climate change (Arnell et al. 2011). The ‘human core’ of the SSPs consists
of detailed population projections by age, sex, and level of education produced by
the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital in Vienna
(Lutz et al. 2014). The decision to include the education variable is based on
the recognition that education plays an important role in both mitigation of and
adaptation to future climate change (Lutz and Striessnig 2015). While the five
different SSPs cannot depict all possible futures, they nevertheless span a broad
range of scenarios that illustrate the main challenges associated with mitigation and
adaptation, as described in detail by O’Neill et al. (2013).
In what is probably the most optimistic scenario, SSP1, the challenges in terms
of both mitigation and adaptation are assumed to be small, and the world makes
very substantial progress towards sustainability. This advancement is achieved
by a high rate of technological progress and subsequent co-operation between
the development leaders and followers. As a consequence, income levels rise
steadily, poverty is further alleviated, and global inequality is reduced. On the
demographic side, SSP1 corresponds to a rapid demographic transition driven by
a rapid expansion of educational systems. Low levels of fertility in today’s high-
fertility countries eventually lead to a comparatively low overall population levels.
SSP2 is referred to as the ‘middle of the road’ scenario because it assumes that
the challenges associated with mitigation and adaptation to climate change will be at
an intermediate level of severity. In this scenario, we experience the continuation of
current trends with regard to development, democratisation, and shifts in the global
energy mix towards more sustainable sources. Educational expansion occurs, but
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not as rapidly as in SSP1. In line with medium assumptions for both fertility and
mortality, population growth does not decelerate to the same extent as in SSP1.
SSP3 describes a world of extreme fragmentation and polarisation. While some
highly industrialised countries pull ahead, large fractions of the world population,
particularly in the global south, are left behind, leading to staggeringly high levels
of inequality across countries. The consequence of this trend is a stalled transition
towards the establishment of knowledge-based societies. As education does not
expand nearly as much as in the previous two scenarios, levels of fertility are
high and population growth is unevenly distributed. Moreover, since international
co-operation is reduced to a minimum, migration between the newly developing
regional blocks of countries does not play a strong role in this scenario’s population
dynamics. Not surprisingly, the challenges associated with both mitigation and
adaptation appear to be insurmountable in this scenario.
SSP4 is different from SSP3 mainly because in this scenario the challenges
associated with mitigation are lower. Yet in SSP4, the adaptive capacities of
societies are rather limited because of high levels of both within- and between-
country inequality. On the one hand, large proportions of people do not make
substantial contributions to global climate change, as they are simply not rich
enough to adopt consumerist Western lifestyles. On the other hand, climate change
becomes a particularly acute threat for the very large numbers of disadvantaged
people who find it difficult to adapt. Demographically, this scenario corresponds to
a high degree of inequality in the distribution of education. Fertility in the medium-
income developing countries is lower under SSP4 than under SSP3, while fertility
in high-income countries is low under both SSP3 and SSP4. The recent increase in
fertility in many rich low-fertility OECD countries (Myrskyla¨ et al. 2009) is halted
because the social transformations that facilitate this trend do not reach far enough.
Finally, SSP5 corresponds to conventional development: i.e. the idea that ‘more
of the same’, or unrestricted economic growth, is going to solve all economic and
social problems. While the environmental consequences of this emphasis on robust
economic growth lead to major mitigation challenges, the adaptation challenges are
rather small because of economic growth. Educational levels are assumed to be
high throughout the world, but the fertility trends are more complex. While fertility
is comparatively high in the countries that are currently rich and have low fertility,
combining work and family becomes increasingly difficult everywhere else in the
world. The overall effect on the world population is mixed.
Figure 2 shows the specific demographic implications of SSP1 to SSP5 in terms
of total population by six major world regions. Although world population growth
is driven primarily by developments in Asia and Africa, the SSPs also show very
different pathways for the smaller regions. While SSP1 and SSP5 lead to rapid
demographic transitions, and thus to lower overall population levels in the three
regions at the bottom of the figure, the three more developed regions in the top
part of the figure experience a reversal in their current fertility trajectories in these
two scenarios. As population continues to increase in the more aﬄuent parts of the
world in particular, mitigation challenges for the planet as a whole are especially
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Figure 2:
Total population according to the five SSPs, six major world regions, 2010–2100
Figure 3:
Population by age, sex, and educational attainment according to the five SSPs, Africa,
2100
large under SSP5. The opposite effect can be observed in SSP3: while populations
in the global north continue to age, fertility transitions in the south are stalled, and
population reaches its maximum level across all of the five SSPs.
The SSPs differ not only in terms of overall population levels, but also in terms of
the population distributions by age, sex, and educational attainment. This diversity
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of outcomes is illustrated by the case of Africa in 2100 in Figure 3. Interestingly, we
can see that both SSP1 and SSP5 lead to very high levels of education and low levels
of overall population. Yet the development pathways leading to these results are very
different: in SSP1 the pathways are sustainability and low levels of emissions, while
in SSP5 the pathways are conventional GDP-focused development and the highest
emissions levels.
3 Predicted disaster deaths under the SSPs
We show the results for decadal projections of future disaster deaths in six major
world regions (a complete list of the countries within each respective region can
be found in Table A.1 in the appendix) by applying the regression estimates from
Table 1 to the demographic scenarios underlying the SSPs. We assume unchanged
hazard levels; i.e. we keep the number of disasters that enter the predictions constant.
While these results are of course highly stylised, the primary focus of this exercise
is to demonstrate the effects of different futures with regard to education, as well as
population heterogeneity on the total number of deaths related to natural disasters.
The trajectories presented in Figure 4 are shaped by both reduced vulnerability due
to increases in educational attainment and increased vulnerability due to population
growth. Since different sub-regions are projected to shift from having positive to
having negative population growth in different decades, the regional aggregates
of decadal deaths are not simply monotonic, but represent upward and downward
trends. In addition, the SSPs do not contain explicit assumptions regarding the future
hazard, future land use, or infant mortality. In our baseline calculations, we therefore
assume that these indicators will remain at their respective values from the base
period of our predictions throughout the entire 21st century. The population growth
rate and the share of women aged 20–39 with at least secondary education enter the
projections with their respective country- and decade-specific values.
Figure 4 clearly shows that due to their sheer size relative to the other three
regions, the bulk of disaster mortality in the 21st century is expected to occur
in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa. However, the ultimate
trajectory depends on the specific population scenario. While under conditions of
fragmentation (SSP3) all three regions experience strong increases in the number
of deaths, under conditions of high levels of inequality (SSP4) Africa experiences
worse effects than Asia and Latin America, as SSP4 is associated with significantly
lower fertility levels than SSP3, and a smaller population is therefore at risk. In
addition, inequality in the expansion of education is greater in SSP4 than in SSP3.
Because the starting distributions of educational attainment are very different in
the three regions, this trend has stronger effects in Asia and Latin America than in
Africa. In the remaining scenarios casualty figures go down in all three regions.
However, our interpretation of these findings changes after we relate the projected
number of deaths to the actual population in the respective SSP scenario (cf.
Figure 2), as we do in Figure 5. We then see that the downward trend in the number
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Figure 4:
Predicted number of decadal deaths in 1000s, assuming constant hazard for six world
regions, 2010–2100
of deaths from extreme natural events experienced in the past will continue in all
regions and SSPs, albeit at different levels. Another difference that becomes more
pronounced when we look at deaths relative to total population size is that between
Europe and North America. This gap is primarily attributable to the excess mortality
associated with the 2003 summer heat wave, which according to EM-DAT figures
caused roughly 20,000 deaths in Italy, 19,000 deaths in France, 15,000 deaths in
Spain, and 9,000 deaths in Germany. In comparison, Hurricane Katrina, the largest
individual disaster experienced by the US in the base period of our projections,
caused ‘only’ 1,800 deaths. Based on these figures, the projected number of deaths
is significantly larger in Europe.
4 Discussion
Our study has shown that different levels of investment in the educational attainment
of populations around the world—captured in the individual definition of each SSP
scenario—can result in dramatic differences in the predicted number of fatalities
due to natural disasters related to climate change. The prediction of a decline in the
number of decadal deaths in each of the six regions can be attributed to both higher
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Figure 5:
Predicted number of decadal deaths per million of population, assuming constant
hazard for six world regions, 2010–2100
levels of education among populations and the accompanying effect of smaller
populations at risk. Our analysis has shown these effects for the first time at the
level of large world regions. Still, much more context-specific analysis of differential
vulnerabilities and the role of demographic factors, including education, is needed in
order to arrive at robust country-specific projections and policy recommendations.
In general, however, our results support the claim that universal basic education
of the entire population, including basic literacy and numeracy, is a key factor in
enhancing the adaptive capacity and reducing the vulnerability of populations.
There are many uncertainties when examining the likely implications of the
different SSPs on future disaster mortality, even without considering climate
change. First, the demographic scenarios underlying the SSPs are not available
in a probabilistic format. Thus, we are not able to assign probabilities to specific
prediction outcomes. Instead, the SSPs are intended to span a reasonable range of
possible futures, and our primary goal here was to translate this range in terms
of future numbers of disaster deaths to complement assessments of the future
vulnerability of people in different parts of the world.
Another uncertainty is related to the extent to which climate change is going to
affect the number of extreme events in those different scenarios. As there is to date
no comparable translation of the SSPs into future numbers of natural disasters for
different geographic areas, we are forced to make some rather general assumptions
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about the frequency of all types of hydro-meteorological extreme events. Hence, we
are unable—as Kriegler et al. (2012) put it—to ‘close the loop’, and to study how
climate outcomes respond to differences in the SSPs. Certainly, low radiative forcing
levels will be harder to achieve at very high population levels (i.e. SSP3 and SSP4),
and attempts to mitigate the consequences of climate change, which are more likely
to succeed under conditions of sustainable development than under conditions of
conventional development, will affect the challenges associated with adaptation.
Another point to keep in mind is the possibility of a spatial redistribution
of populations as an adaptation strategy, which is not considered in our model.
In addition, due to emergency preparedness plans that have been implemented
in response to previous natural disasters (for example, many European cities
implemented such plans in reaction to the high number of excess deaths during the
2003 heat wave, and these plans appear to have greatly reduced casualty numbers
during subsequent heat waves; see Cadot et al. 2007), it is less likely that similar
events will lead to similar numbers of casualties in the future. Studying these
extremely important dynamics is left to future analyses.
Since the general assumption behind the results shown is that hazard levels will
remain constant at base period levels, the finding that casualty figures are almost
universally going down is of course somewhat optimistic. Indeed, most climate
scientists would view this as a rather unlikely scenario. Since the assessment of
the future frequency of natural disasters around the world depends on a myriad
of factors, such as geography and societies’ capacities to prevent extreme natural
events from turning into disasters, the IPCC is rather careful in quantifying the
effect of climate change on the number of extreme natural events. There seems to be
a general consensus, however, that almost all types of disasters are becoming more
frequent as a consequence of sea level rise and higher global mean temperatures
(IPCC 2014). Hence, the projected numbers of deaths are conservative, and are thus
probably too low.
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Countries by world region
Latin America and Northern
Asia Europe Africa The Caribbean Oceania America
Afghanistan Albania Algeria Argentina Australia Canada
Armenia Austria Angola Bahamas Fiji United States of
America
Azerbaijan Belarus Benin Barbados French Polynesia
Bangladesh Belgium Botswana Belize Guam
Bhutan Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Burkina Faso Bolivia Micronesia (Fed.
States of)
Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burundi Brazil New Caledonia
Cambodia Croatia Cameroon Chile New Zealand
China Czech Republic Cape Verde Colombia Papua New Guinea
Cyprus Denmark Central African
Republic
Costa Rica Samoa
Dem. People’s Estonia Chad Cuba Solomon Islands
Republic of Korea
Georgia Finland Comoros Dominican Republic Tonga
India France Congo Ecuador Vanuatu







Iraq Hungary Djibouti Guatemala
Israel Iceland Egypt Guyana
Japan Ireland Eritrea Haiti
Jordan Italy Ethiopia Honduras
Kazakhstan Latvia Gabon Jamaica
Kuwait Lithuania Gambia Mexico





Lebanon Norway Guinea Bissau Paraguay
Malaysia Poland Kenya Peru
Maldives Portugal Lesotho Puerto Rico
Mongolia Republic of Moldova Liberia Saint Lucia




Nepal Russian Federation Madagascar Suriname
Oman Slovakia Malawi Trinidad and Tobago
Pakistan Slovenia Mali Uruguay
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Table A.1:
Continued
Latin America and Northern
Asia Europe Africa The Caribbean Oceania America
Republic of Korea Sweden Mauritius
Saudi Arabia Switzerland Morocco




Tajikistan United Kingdom Niger
Thailand Nigeria
Timor Teste Rwanda
Turkey Sao Tome and
Principe
Uzbekistan Senegal
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